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By Wendy C. Gerzog
The moral of Linton v. United States1 is that disaster
looms for achieving desired family entity discounts when
all significant events are performed in one day, especially
when they occur without meticulous care.
According to the limited liability company agreement,
William Linton formed WLFB Investments, LLC (WLFB
LLC) on November 7, 2002. The agreement gave him and
his wife, Stacy, the power over the everyday business of
the LLC, and it restricted transfers to nonfamily mem-
bers.2 On January 22, 2003, Linton transferred 50 percent
of the LLC to his wife. Also on January 22, he executed a
quitclaim deed transferring undeveloped real property to
the LLC, and authorized the transfer of stocks, municipal
bonds, and cash to the LLC. As managers of WLFB LLC,
the Lintons signed ‘‘An Assignment of Assets’’ agree-
ment concerning those transfers.3
Also, on January 22, 2003, the Lintons and Mr. Linton’s
brother James, who was appointed trustee, executed
undated separate trusts agreements and ‘‘Gift of Percent-
age Interest in WLFB Investments, LLC’’ documents (Gift
Documents), in connection with the Lintons’ transfers to
their four children. According to its terms, the trusts were
irrevocable and effective when property was contributed
to the trust. The trust documents also stated that ‘‘the
Grantors have transferred percentage interests in the
WLFB Investments LLC’’ for their children’s benefit
when they signed the trust agreement, and that James as
trustee acknowledged having received the property. Ac-
cording to the Gift Documents, the children’s trusts each
received an 11.25 percent LLC interest from each parent,
so that the trusts collectively owned 90 percent of the
LLC.4
In his deposition, Mr. Hack, the attorney who had
prepared the documents, stated that several months after
the documents were executed, he inserted January 22,
2003, as the date on all of the documents. In that
deposition, he also contended that the dates of the trust
and the transfers of the LLC interests to the trusts should
have been January 31, 2003. Linton emphasized in his
own deposition that the reason for executing all of the
documents, and for all of the transfers, was to achieve
lack of marketability and minority discounts to lower his
and his wife’s transfer tax liabilities.5
On audit, denying the taxpayers both a nonmarket-
ability discount and a minority discount for taxable gifts
that they made to their children, the government in-
creased the size of their taxable gifts respectively for
William from $725,548 to $1,587,988 and for Stacy from
$724,000 to $1,520,440. The Lintons sought a partial
refund of gift taxes.6
The district court granted the government’s motion
for summary judgment.7 The court explained that a
contribution of property to a partnership is treated as an
indirect gift to the partners when, instead of increasing
the transferor’s capital account by the full amount of the
contribution, the other partners’ capital accounts reflect a
proportionate enhanced value because of a transferor’s
contribution.8 The court reviewed the Tax Court’s con-
clusion in Shepherd v. Commissioner9 that the transfers of
property to a partnership, which was not formed until
the next day, had occurred at the same time so that the
transfers constituted indirect gifts of the underlying
property interests.10 The court contrasted Shepherd with
Estate of Jones v. Commissioner11 and Gross v. Commis-
sioner,12 and distinguished the latter cases, in which the
taxpayers successfully argued that the transferor had
transferred partnership interests to his children. In both
1638 F. Supp.2d 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2009), Doc 2009-15152, 2009
TNT 126-15.
2Id. at 1281.
3Id. at 1278-1279. William signed as assignor and they both
signed as managers of WLFB LLC. Id. at 1279.
4Id. at 1279-1280.
5Id. at 1280.
6Id. at 1278.
7Id. The court also denied the taxpayers’ cross-motion for
partial summary judgment and dismissed the taxpayers’ com-
plaint, with prejudice. Id. at 1278 and 1290.
8Id. at 1282.
9115 T.C. 376 (2000), Doc 2000-27642, 2000 TNT 209-15.
10Linton, 638 F. Supp.2d at 1282-1283.
11116 T.C. 121 (2001), Doc 2001-6611, 2001 TNT 45-12.
12Gross v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-221, Doc 2008-
20847, 2008 TNT 190-17. See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Gross: FLP
Sequence and Its Consequence,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 1, 2008, p. 1075,
Doc 2008-23927, or 2008 TNT 232-81.
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Jones and Gross, the donor’s gifts affected only the trans-
feror’s capital accounts and did not enhance the other
partners’ interests.13
In Linton, the government maintained that the facts
were most like those in Senda v. Commissioner,14 in that the
significant events occurred on the same date or that the
order of incidents was uncertain. In Senda, wherein the
sequence of events (that is, partnership formation and
property transfers) was unclear, the Tax Court held that
the transfers were indirect gifts.15 Although originally
undated, the pertinent documents in Linton were all later
dated on January 22, 2003. While the court agreed to
consider the taxpayers’ parol evidence for purposes of
the motion for summary judgment, what controlled here
was ‘‘the express language of these documents [that]
establishes that the Trusts were created and the gifts were
made on January 22, 2003.’’16
In response to the taxpayers’ suggestion that the trusts
were ineffective on January 22, 2003, because they lacked
a trust res, the court held that any type of property may
be the subject of a trust and that the res was the partial
interests in the LLC ‘‘which existed and were contributed
to the Trusts at or before the signing of the Trust
Agreements on January 22, 2003.’’17 On that date, the LLC
owned both undeveloped real property transferred by
quitclaim deed and securities transferred as reflected in
the Assignment of Assets document. According to the
Linton court, moreover, the taxpayers’ argument support-
ing their contention of no trust res conflicted with their
statements offered to bolster their argument about the
purported sequence of events.18
Essentially, the taxpayers failed to prove that the
transactions were of LLC interests and were not ‘‘indirect
gifts to the Trusts of pro rata shares of the assets
conveyed to the LLC.’’19 The court concluded that on
January 22, 2003, the trusts were valid and the taxpayers
gave the partnership interests to the children’s trusts so
that, like in Shepherd and in Senda, the transfers of assets
occurred either before or at the same time as the transfers
of LLC interests.
Alternatively, applying the step transaction doctrine,
the Linton court found that the taxpayers made indirect
gifts to the children’s trusts. Under that doctrine, a court
can compress a series of steps to view them as one
transaction. Courts apply several different tests to con-
sider the appropriate application of the doctrine20; how-
ever, the Linton court held that under any of those tests,
the taxpayers made indirect gifts. Although the appro-
priateness of the step transaction doctrine is usually a
factual issue, the court concluded that there would not be
much utility in holding a trial to determine the legal
issues when the evidence was unchallenged.21 Therefore,
under Penrod v. Commissioner,22 the court held as a matter
of law that the step transaction doctrine applied.23
Unlike in Holman v. Commissioner24 or Gross,25 two
cases in which the Tax Court refused to apply the step
transaction doctrine, the Linton court stated that there
was no passage of time producing an ‘‘independent
significance to a partner’s transfer of property to a
partnership and the subsequent gift of an interest in that
partnership to another.’’26 In Holman, the Tax Court held
that a six-day delay between the two transactions sug-
gested that ‘‘the taxpayers bore a ‘real economic risk’ that
the value of an LP unit could change.’’27 Likewise, in
Gross, the Tax Court emphasized the interval of 11 days
between the two events. In Linton, by contrast, there was
no indication of a gap between the two transactions and,
therefore, no showing of a ‘‘real economic risk.’’ The
taxpayers failed to submit any evidence ‘‘concerning the
fluctuations, if any, in the prices of the various securities
at issue on a daily basis during the period in question.’’28
Also, the two transactions would never have occurred
13Linton, 638 F. Supp.2d, at 1283.
14433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-436, 2006 TNT 5-12.
See Gerzog, ‘‘Return to Senda: Order Determinative for FLP
Discounts,’’ Tax Notes, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 791, Doc 2006-1385, or
2006 TNT 30-40.
15Linton, 638 F. Supp.2d, at 1283-1284.
16Id. at 1285.
17Id. at 1286.
18Id. at 1287:
Plaintiffs also contend that the transfer of securities was
effective on January 22, 2003, when Mr. Linton executed
the Assignment of Assets in favor of WLFB LLC. Al-
though plaintiffs make this argument for another reason,
namely in an effort to show that the contribution of
securities to the LLC occurred prior to the gifts of LLC
interests to the Trusts, having advanced this position,
plaintiffs will not be heard to challenge whether WLFB
LLC had assets, or whether percentage interests in WLFB
LLC constituted adequate trust res, on January 22, 2003.
19Id.
20The courts apply either ‘‘(i) the ‘binding commitment’ test;
(ii) the ‘end result’ test; [or] (iii) the ‘interdependence’ test.’’ Id.
at 1288.
21Id. at 1288-1289:
The binding commitment test is met because plaintiffs
executed binding Trust Agreements and Gift Documents
at the same time they took the first step of contributing
property to the LLC; as counsel for plaintiffs conceded
during oral argument, these documents would have been
valid after signing had they never been dated. The end
result test is likewise satisfied because plaintiffs undis-
putedly had a subjective intent to convey as much
property as possible to their children while minimizing
their gift tax liability, pursuant to which they crafted, with
the aid of an attorney and a tax advisor, a scheme
consisting of ‘pre-arranged parts of a single transaction.’
*** In addition, the interdependence test is met because
the undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs
would not have undertaken one or more of the steps at
issue absent their ‘contemplation of the other integrating
acts.’
2288 T.C. 1415 (1987).
23Linton, 638 F. Supp.2d, at 1290.
24130 T.C. 170 (2008), Doc 2008-11723, 2008 TNT 103-6. See
Gerzog, ‘‘Holman: The FLP’s New Clothes,’’ Tax Notes, Sep. 22,
2008, p. 1215, Doc 2008-19015, or 2008 TNT 185-23.
25Gross, T.C. Memo. 2008-221. See Gerzog, ‘‘Gross: FLP Se-
quence and Its Consequence,’’ supra note 12.
26Linton, 638 F. Supp.2d, at 1289.
27Id.
28Id. at 1289-1290.
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without ‘‘the anticipated 40 percent to 49 percent dis-
count in calculating gift taxes.’’29
Shepherd, Senda, and Jones
In Shepherd, the taxpayer and his sons were partners in
a limited partnership the father had previously estab-
lished; then the taxpayer contributed land to the partner-
ship, which enhanced all three of their partnership
interests. Thus, the taxpayer made an indirect gift of the
land to his sons, thereby denying the transfer any valua-
tion discounts, instead of a gift of partnership interests to
them.30 Likewise, in Senda, the circuit court upheld the
Tax Court’s finding that the taxpayers had not produced
sufficient evidence that their contributions of stock to two
family limited partnerships (FLPs) preceded their trans-
fer of FLP interests to their children.31 In Senda, the
taxpayers had depended on unreliable after-the-fact
documents, such as tax returns. Likewise, the two letters
faxed to their tax advisers did not conclusively determine
the order of events:
The first letter is dated the same day as the transfer
of stock to the first partnership, and thus does not
indicate any specific order of events. The second
letter is dated two days after the second stock
transfer, although the Sendas’ return says they
transferred the partnership interests two days ear-
lier, the same day as the stock transfer. Significantly,
the testimony of Mark Senda — that his business
practice is to execute documents and transactions
‘‘as of’’ a certain date — undercuts the reliability of
the dates on the letters.32
The circuit court in Senda, therefore, did not reverse the
factual and credibility findings of the Tax Court.
In Jones, by contrast, the court held that the decedent
had made gifts of limited partnership interests to his son
and four daughters. First, he contributed assets, includ-
ing real estate, to FLPs and those transfers were properly
reflected in his capital accounts and did not increase any
of the other partners’ FLP interests. Later that same day,
he transferred a large part of his partnership interests to
his five children through a clear order of events that
enabled the decedent’s gifts to benefit from FLP dis-
counts. ‘‘All of the contributions of property were prop-
erly reflected in the capital accounts of decedent, and the
value of the other partners’ interests was not enhanced
by the contributions of decedent. Therefore, the contri-
butions do not reflect taxable gifts.’’33
Step Transaction Doctrine
In Penrod, the government argued that two events, the
taxpayers’ purchase and sale of McDonald’s stock,
should be merged as one transaction, causing numerous
negative tax consequences, while the taxpayers con-
tended they were two separate and independent trans-
actions.34 To resolve the issue, the court considered the
application of the step transaction doctrine.
In Penrod, the court found that there was no binding
commitment to sell the stock and that at the time of the
acquisition the taxpayers did not intend to sell their
stock, but instead only chose to do so later because of
subsequent events. Therefore, the court held that none of
the three tests required the application of the step trans-
action doctrine, which would have combined the two
steps.35 Consequently, the court held that there was a
continuity of interest as required for the acquisition of the
stock to comprise a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A).
In Senda, the circuit court held that the Tax Court had
properly used the step transaction doctrine to determine
the character of the transferred property. The court held
that the lower court’s findings that the transactions were
integrated and concurrent were thoroughly corroborated
by the facts. While the taxpayers contended that applica-
tion of the doctrine is restricted to identifying the donor
or donee in a gift tax case, the appellate court cited two of
its opinions, Sather v. Commissioner36 and Estate of Schuler
v. Commissioner,37 when the court maintained that its
application extended to resolving the nature of the trans-
ferred property.38 ‘‘In sum, the Sendas’ proposed limita-
tion would be contrary to the precedent of the Supreme
Court, which calls the step transaction doctrine ‘well-
established’ and ‘expressly sanctioned.’’’39
In Holman, the Tax Court refused to apply the step
transaction doctrine to find an indirect gift of stock to the
taxpayer’s children. The court interpreted the govern-
ment’s argument as adopting the interdependence test.
The court, however, refused to conclude that ‘‘the legal
relations created by the partnership agreement would
have been fruitless had petitioners not also made the 1999
gift.’’40 The court speculated that the government’s deci-
sion not to argue indirect gifts for the taxpayer’s 2000 and
2001 transfers of similar sequence implicitly accepted the
independent significance of the two transfer events.41
29Id. at 1289.
30Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 385.
31Senda, at 1047.
32Id.
33Jones, 116 T.C. at 128.
34Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1427 (The determination of this issue
would affect the continuity of interest test required for the
taxpayers’ acquisition to qualify as a as a tax-deferred reorga-
nization under section 368(a). Under the government’s theory,
the taxpayers would have to recognize gain from the exchange
of their stock in 1975. The benefits of a tax-deferred reorganiza-
tion are derived from the principle ‘‘that the shareholders of an
acquired corporation have not terminated their economic in-
vestment, but have merely altered its form.’’ Id.).
35Id. at 1434.
36251 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2001), Doc 2001-16149, 2001 TNT
112-94.
37282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002).
38Senda, 433 F.3d at 1049. See Schuler, 282 F.3d at 579. In Sather
and Schuler, the circuit court had applied the reciprocal trust
doctrine, which it considered a variant of the doctrine of
substance over form and which the Tax Court referred to as the
reciprocal transaction doctrine, to deny additional annual exclu-
sions for gifts made by the taxpayer and his brother to each
other’s children. Id.
39Senda, 433 F.3d at 1049. See supra note 20.
40Holman, 130 T.C. at 188.
41Id. at 189-190.
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Also, the court emphasized that the value of the FLP
interests fluctuated between November 2, 1999, and
November 8, 1999, during which time the taxpayers bore
that risk.42
Finally, in Gross, the government argued that the
taxpayer made an indirect gift in fact, or under the step
transaction doctrine. However, the court rejected both
arguments. The court agreed with the taxpayer on the
timing of the two transactions and held that the step
transaction doctrine did not apply, because 11 days
separated the final transfers of the transferor’s stock to
her FLP and her gifts of partnership interests to her
daughters, and because the stocks were all, or virtually
all, ‘‘heavily traded, relatively volatile common stocks.’’43
Analysis and Conclusion
Linton is a case that parallels Senda and underlines the
importance of following the proper sequence of transfers
to guarantee the receipt of valuable family LLC or FLP
discounts. Estate planners need to ensure that the trans-
feror’s asset contribution is properly reflected in his
capital account before the transferor makes gifts of inter-
ests in that entity to family members. To defeat the
application of the step transaction doctrine, litigators
need to provide evidence of economic risk existing
between the two transaction dates.
A comparison between Shepherd, Senda, and Linton on
one hand and Holman and Gross on the other, indicates
that the step transaction doctrine has been applied only
when the two transactions of contributing assets to the
family LLC or FLP, and of effecting gifts of interests in
that family entity, have occurred on the same date, and
when a court alternatively finds an indirect gift in fact
from the unclear or unfavorable evidence of the sequence
of those two events. In sum, there is only a limited
application of the step transaction doctrine in this con-
text; courts appear to have applied the doctrine only
when it has not changed the outcome of the case.42Id. at 190-191; 191, n. 7.
43Gross, T.C. Memo. 2008-221 at 20, n.5.
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